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A Statistical Analysis of the School
Finance Decisions: On Winning
Battles and Losing Wars'
The American judiciary is at the threshold of dismantling the edu-
cational finance systems of almost every state. Recent federal and state
court decisions have condemned five such systems as violations of the
equal protection guarantees in the United States Constitution.' Their
common theory has been that reliance on property taxes produces
substantial disparities in local educational expenditures and that such
funding "invidiously discriminates against the poor because it makes
the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of his
parents and neighbors." 2 Suits presently at various stages of the ju-
* The authors wish to express their appreciation to Howard, K. Gilbert for his as.
sistance in the statistical portion of this Note.
1. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex.
1971), prob. juris. noted, 92 S. Ct. 2413 (1972); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 331 F. Supp. 870
(D. Minn. 1971); Hollins v. Shofstall, No. C-253652 (Super. Ct. Ariz., Jan. 13, 1972); Rob-
inson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 581,
487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1972).
2. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 589, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. 6)1, 61(1971). Commentary on Serrano, the leading case in its field, has been extensive. See, e.g.,
Bateman & Brown, Some Reflections on Serrano v. Priest, 49 J. Uiw., L. 701 (1972);
Berke 8- Callahan, Serrano v. Priest: Milestone or Millstone for School Finance, 21 .
Pun. LAw 23 (1972); Coons, Clune & Sugarman, A First Appraisal of Serrano, 2 YALE I. L.
& Soc. AcrioN 111 (1972); Dimond, Serrano: A T'ictory of Sorts for Ethics, Not Xecesarilyfor Education, 2 YALE REV. L. & Soc. Acrio\ 133 (1972); Goldstein, Interdistrict In.
equalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and Its Progeny,
120 U. PA. L. REv. 504 (1972); Johnson, Serrano: Legal Rationale, Social Reflections,
Political Response, 5 IND. LEGAL F. 231 (1972); Karst, Serrano v. Priest: A State Court's
Responsibilities and opportunities in the Development of Federal Constitutional Law,
60 CALIF. L. REv. 720 (1972); Kirp & Yudof, Serrano in the political Arena, 2 YALE Rxv.
L. & Soc. AnrsoN 143 (1972); Note, The Public School Financing Cases: Interdistrict In.
equalities and Wealth Discrimination, 14 APaz. L. REv. 88 (1972); Comment, The Eo.
lution of Equal Protection: Education, Municipal Services, and Wealth, 7 H&tv. Civ.
RIGHTs-Civ. Lm. L. REv. 103 (1972); Note. Serrano v. Priest: The End of an Era in Public
School Financing, 23 HAsrINGs L.J. 365 (1972); Note, Serrano v. Priest in Iowa: Financing
Public Education Under the Fourteenth Amendnent, 57 IowV. L. REV. 378 (1972); Com-
ment, Serrano v. Priest and the Financing of Public Education in Kansas: Beyond the
Rhetoric, 20 KAN,. L. REv. 433 (1972); Note, Public Schools: Serrano v. Pricst-A Chal-
lenge to Kentucky, 60 Ky. L.J. 156 (1971); Note, Equal Protection and Public School
Financing: Serrano v. Priest, 5 LoyoL (LA.) L. RE%. 162 (1972); Note, Constitutional
Law: Equal Quality in Educational Opportunities-"The Necessary Revolution," 40
UMKC L. REv. 185 (1972); Note, The Equal Protection Clause arid Public School Fi-
nancing-Serrano v. Priest, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 557 (1972); Comment, Equality of Edu-
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dicial process could overturn the systems of thirty-one states.3 Final
resolution of these cases will await the Supreme Court's consideration,
this term, of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.4
But regardless of that case's outcome, the courts will almost certainly
remand the task of restructuring educational finance to the legislatures
rather than assuming it themselves.
This Note will examine the school finance decisions with an eye
toward this restructuring. It will be argued that the three critical
premises on which these decisions are based-premises concerning
individual wealth, district property values, and local educational ex-
penditures-are fraught with ambiguities in their definition of key
terms. As a result of these ambiguities, the decisions leave the legis-
latures latitude to revise educational finance in ways which would
not help-and in fact could hurt-the poor.
All of the decisions to date contain the following premises:
(i) The individual wealth of the residents of a school district is
directly related to the assessed value of the property in that district;
(ii) Assessed property value is directly related, because of reliance
on property taxes, to local educational expenditure levels;
(iii) Local educational expenditures are directly related to the
quality of public education.
The legal argument contends that the above chain relationship be-
tween individual wealth and quality education is constitutionally im-
permissible.
Although there has been rather extensive commentary on Premise
Three,5 there has been very little serious analysis of Premises One and
Two. Therefore, while the Note will discuss the jurisprudential prob-
lems of all three Premises in Part I, it will focus, in Part II, on
Premises One and Two using Connecticut as a model. Finally, in Part
III, it will analyze a number of fiscal alternatives that could be em-
ployed in revising educational finance.
cation: Serrano v. Priest, 58 VA. L. REV. 161 (1972); 4 CONN. L. REV. .391 (1971); 3 CoMuet,
SAM L. REV. 211 (1972); 60 GEO. L.J. 799 (1972); 85 HARV. L. REV. 1019 (1972); 43 MIS.
L.J. 266 (1972); 17 N.Y.L.F. 1147 (1972); 47 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 610 (1972); 3 Sr. MAIt's
L.J. 347 (1971); 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 162 (1972); 40 U. CINN. L. REV. 891 (1971); 1971 U.
ILL. L.F. 524 (1971); 6 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 441 (1972); 24 VAND. L. REV. 1265 (1971);
18 WAYNE L. REV. 787 (1972); 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1972).
3. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, 11.
linois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
Island, S6uth Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. ANALYSIS
OF INTRASTATE SCHOOL FINANCE CASES, U.S. Office of Education Task Force on School
Finance (1972).
4. 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971), prob. furis. noted, 92 S, Ct. 2413 (1972).
5. See pp. 1315-16, n.55-57 infra.
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I. The Logic and Limitations of the School Finance Decisions
A. Premise One: Individual Wealth is Related to District Wealth
Premise One, involving proof of a relationship between individual
and district wealth, serves to identify the injured class as the children
of the poor. Although such identification is essential (as will be argued
here) from both a legal and fiscal standpoint, the school finance de-
cisions have thus far largely ignored its significance. In Sen'ano v.
Priest the state did contend that the taxable wealth of a school dis-
trict, as measured by assessed property value per pupil, was not neces-
sarily related to the individual wealth of its residents.7 The California
Supreme Court could have rejected this contention on the grounds
that the state's demurrer necessarily conceded plaintiffs' factual alle-
gations.8 But the court went further, stating that discrimination on
the basis of district wealth, without any tie to individual wealth, was
invalid per se.9 The court cited no authority for this conclusion, but
rather intimated that the arbitrariness of the system injured pupils
in all districts except the wealthiest in the state.'0 In Van Dusartz v.
Hatfield, the district court similarly did not feel compelled to find
any relationship between individual and district wealth. 1' Two other
decisions, Hollins v. Shofstall'2 and Robinson v. Cahill,13 are silent
on the issue.
Only one court to date has clearly identified the children of the
6. "Per pupil" measurements in Senano were in terms of average daily attendance
(ADA), the ratio of total students present each day divided by the number of school
days in the school year. 5 Cal. d 584, 592, 487 P.2d 1241, 1246, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 606,
n.4 (1971).
7. Throughout this Note we shall define individual wealth as individual income.
It might be argued that accumulations of wealth-as is common among the elderl)--
should be considered. But this is seldom done in statistical anal)sis both because it is
difficult to compile figures on wealth accumulations and as it is typically assumed
that such accumulations-in any given sample-follow income closely.
8. The state originally filed general demurrers to the complaint. The trial court
sustained the demurrers and, upon plaintiffs' failure to amend, entered an order of
dismissal. The court of appeals affirmed this order. 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr.
345 (1970).
9. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 612
(1971).
10. Id. at 601, 487 P.2d at 1252-53, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13. Plaintiff school children
represented "all public school pupils in California, 'except children in that school district.
the identity of which is presently unknown, which school district affords the greatest
educational opportunity of all school districts within California.'" Id. at 589. 187 P.2d
at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604 (1971).
11. Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 872, n.2 (D. Minn. 1971).
12. No. C-253652 (Super. Ct. Ariz., Jan. 13, 1972) (motion to dismiss for failure to
state an actionable claim, denied). Subsequently, plaintiffs' motion for summary judg-
ment was granted on the basis of reasoning identical to that proffered on the preliminary
motion. (Super. Ct. Ariz., June 6, 1972.)
13. 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972).
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poor as the victims of traditional school finance. In San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the three-judge federal
panel concluded from rather slight evidence that there was a relation-
ship between property values and median family income. 1'4
In Private Wealth and Public Education, the Bible of school cquali-
zation, Professors Coons, Clune, and Sugarman attempt to justify such
minimal attention to individual wealth by contending that all children
in "poor" districts, regardless of parental wealth, are injured when
less is spent on their education than is expended in "wealthy" dis-
tricts.15 To the extent that district wealth does dictate educational
quality,' 6 and to the extent that non-poor children in poor districts
do not defect to private schools, this argument may have some force.
But it may nevertheless prove vulnerable when evaluated in terms
of the legal and policy considerations in the school finance decisions.
1. The Legal Significance of Premise One
For the purpose of legal argument, the pupils in low-wealth school
districts may be conceptualized as two separate groups. The first,
poor children in poor districts, can claim that because of their indi-
vidual poverty, they are deprived of a fundamental right, equal ecdu-
cational opportunity. Although the legal theory supporting this claim
is not conclusive, it is accepted by many commentators17 and a grow-
14. 337 F. Supp. 280, 282 (W.D. Tex. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 92 S. Ct. 2113 (1972).
Plaintiffs showed the following relationship between district and individual wealth for
the sample of 110 districts surveyed:
Market Value of Taxable Median Family Income
Property Pcr Pupil (1960 Census)
Above $100,000 (10 districts) $5900
$100,000-$150,000 (26 districts) 4425$50,000-$30,000 (30 districts) 4900
$30,000-$10,000 (40 districts) 5050
Below $10,000 (4 districts) 3325
Affidavit of Joel S. Berke at 6.
A substudy of the six districts in Bexar County also indicated a direct relationship
between the wealth factors (Berke Affidavit at 25).
15. J. COONS, W. CLUNE, S. SUGARMAN, PRIVA'IE WVEAL'III AND PuVLIc EDUCATION 2,
152-54 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PRIVATE WEALTr; references to Professor Coonis In the
text include collaborators Clune and Sugarman, except where otherwise indicatcd].
16. But see pp. 1310-19.
17. See, e.g., A. ,VIsE, RicH ScnooLs, Poop ScIooLs: TuE PRoMaIsE oF EQUAL Et.
CATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 11-18, 163-78 (1969); PRIVATE WEALTH 339-433; Dimond, Serrano:
A Victory of Sorts for Ethics, Not Necessarily for Education, 2 YALE RLV. LAW F SOC,
ACTION 133, 134-35 (1972), Horowitz, Unseparate but Unequal-The Emerging l.ourleenth
Amendment Issue in Public Education, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1147 (1966), Horowltz &
Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public Education and Publie As.
sistance Programs From Place to Place Within a State, 15 U.C.L.A. L. RMV. 787, 801.12(1968); Kirp, Tile Poor, The Schools and Equal Protection, 38 IAav. Louc. REV. 635,
637-46 (1968); Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional
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ing number of courts.' 8 But the second group-non-poor children
in poor districts-cannot base their legal claim on personal poverty;
rather they must complain of the sheer irrationality of a system that
allocates education on the basis of property values. 9 Such a claim is
unrelated to wealth analysis, except insofar as district wealth is viewed
as an arbitrary classification.2 0 The argument would be similar and
no less tenable should the state make educational expenditures de-
pendent on some other irrelevant factor, such as the number of tele-
phone poles in the district.
Serrano and its progeny ignore the distinction between these two
claims. Instead, the decisions attack discrimination on the basis of
district wealth, a discrimination affecting both classes of children.
While such analysis is structurally sound, it may be legally deficient.
Every case cited in Serrano to support the contention that discrimina-
tion on the basis of district wealth is "suspect" deals with individual
poverty.2 1 These cases, invalidating certain criminal procedures22 and
Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. Cii. L. REV. 584-89 (1968); :Michelnan, Foreword: Ot
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amiendincnt, 83 H.%iw. L. REV. 7. 47-59
(1969); Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education, 71 COLxs. L. Rtv.
1355, 1362-67 (1971); Shanks, Equal Education and the Lau, 3'9 Astm. ScnoLvrt 233,
261-63 (1970); Shanks, Educational Financing and Equal Protection: will te California
Supreme Court's Breahthrough Become te Late of the Land?, 1 J. Lmv & EDc. 76, 87-93
(1972); Silard & White, Intra-State Inequalities in Public Education: The Case for ju-
dicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause, 1970 Wise. L. REV. 1, 16.19; Comment,
The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education, Municipal Sercties, and lealth, 7
HARv. CIV. RIGHrs-Civ. Li. L. REV. 103, 105-51 (1972); Gf. Note, Developmentls in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAMS'. L. REV. 1065, 1087-1131 (1969).
18. See, e.g., Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dep't, .149 F.2d 871, 881-81 C2d Cir.
1971) (Kaufman, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 916 (1972); Ilargrac v. McKiuny,
413 F.2d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 1969), oi remand sub nora. Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Stipp. 911
(M.D. Fla. 1970), vacated on other grounds sub nom. .Akew v. largrave. 401 U.S. 576
(1971); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. 280, 82.83
(W.D. Tex. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 92 S. Ct. 2413 (1972); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield. 33-1
F. Supp. 870, 874-76 (D. Minn. 1971); Hollins v. Sho[stall, No. C-253652 (Super. Ct. Ari..
Jan. 13, 1972) at 6 (slip); Robinson Y. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 274-75, 287 A.2d 187,
213-14 (1972).
19. PRIVA'T WvEALT11 154.
20. In justifying Serrano's failure to examine the rclationship between individual and
district wealth, Coons, Clune and Sugarman maintain that the opinion of the court,
"has as much to do with rationality in government as with povert)." Coons, Clune &
Sugarman, A First Appraisal of Serrano, 2 YALE REV. L. &- Soc. Acnos 111, 115 (1971).
21. 5 Cal. 3d at 597-98, 602-03, 487 P.2d at 1250, 1253-54., 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610, 613-11.
Cf. Kirp & Yudoff, Serrano in the Political Arena, 2 YAtu: REV. L.w & Soi. Acrio
143, 147, n.3 (1971); Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education, 71
COLUM.. L. REV. 1355, 1405 (1971).
22. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (imprisonment for failure to pay fine for of-
fense punishable only by fine); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (inlprisonnCnt
beyond the maximum sentence when nonpayment of fine is involuntar); Roberts v.
La Vallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (requiring payment for a copy of minutes of a preliminary
hearing); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (den)ing defendant counsel ishen
appointed attorney summarily inforns court that appeal is not meritorious); Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (denying defendant counsel on first appeal when a cotrt
independently decides that appeal lacks merit); Smith v. Bennet. 365 US. 703 (1961)
(requiring the payment of filing fees prior to the docketing of appeals and habeas
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suffrage restrictions,23 concern the inability of poor individuals to pay
for essential public services or benefits. The Serrano court simply
had no authority to support the proposition that the poverty of a
collective unit triggers "suspect classification" analysis.24
This i5 not to say that it is impossible to argue that the non-poor
child should receive judicial protection.2 5 First, as noted above, the
non-poor child could claim that he is injured as the system irrationally
diverts educational resources from his district. Or he might argue that
discriminations on the basis of collective wealth should be constitu-
tionally suspect. The plaintiffs here have to convince the court that
equal protection analysis should be extended to this more subtle form
of discrimination.2 6 Finally, Coons has suggested that one could con-
sider all children-regardless of parental wealth-as poverty stricken. "
Although both the factual and legal assumptions of this last approach
are clearly open to challenge, it does have the advantage of making
the "individual poverty" decisions applicable. Judicial examination
of these theories would be valuable, but such analysis is unlikely as
long as the courts blur the legally distinct concepts of individual and
district wealth.
2. The Fiscal Implications of Premise One
Beyond these inadequacies in legal argument, the failure of Serrano
to require a factual demonstration of Premise One may also have
serious fiscal implications. A high concentration of commercial or
corpus applications); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (requiring the payment of filing
fees as condition precedent to criminal appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(conditioning the availability of trial transcripts on ability to pay); In re Antazo, 3 Cal.
3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970) (imprisoning convicted indigent defendant
solely because of an inability to pay a fine).
23. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax held ti-
constitutional); McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (precluding the
availability of absentee ballots to unsentenced inmates in county jails held unconsti-
tutional).
24. It had been well settled, in fact, that subdivisions of a state were not "persons"
protected by the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.s.
182 (1923); Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192 (1923). Hence a school district has no
standing to challenge educational financing under the equal protection clause. Tripplctt
v. Tiemann, 302 F. Supp. 1239, 1242 (D. Neb. 1969); Carlsbad Union School Dist, of
San Diego County v. Rafferty, 300 F. Supp. 434, 441 (S.D. Cal. 1969), ajf'd 429 F.2d 337
(9th Cir. 1970); Village of Blaine v. Independent School Dist. No. 12, 272 Minn. 343,
350-57, 138 N.W.2d 32, 38 (1965) (dictum).
25. But see Kaimowitz, After Mclnnis v. Shapiro: Equal Educational opportuailyfor Whom?, 3 CLEARING HoUsE REv. 89 (1969).
26. Although the poverty cases have thus far been based on personal iablity to
pay, nothing in their legal theory would prevent their extension to collective poverty,
provided that the collective unit is not a political subdivision. Two recent Supreme
Court decisions, however, suggest that the Court may be unwilling to permit such an
extension. Cf. p. 1320, n.79-80 infra.
27. PRIVATE WEALTH 152-53.
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industrial property in a district with many poor residents may skew
the relationship between district and individual wealth. Four com-
binations are obviously possible: (i) districts where both property
value and family income are high; (ii) districts where both are low;
(iii) districts where property value is high but income is low; and
(iv) districts where property value is low but income is high. In-
dividual wealth and district wealth do not correlate in the last two
situations. A policy shifting funds to low-wealth districts, while re-
warding those in situation (ii), will needlessly aid situation (iv)
residents, and yet bypass the poor'in situation (iii) districts.28 Thus
a policy favoring low-wealth districts could shift resources toward the
"rich," away from the "poor."
Coons, Clune, and Sugarman defend such a policy by defining away
this problem of diverting resources from the poor. They insist that
the non-poor, as well as the poor, are victimized when their school
districts spend less than others and urge that both groups deserve
judicial protection.2 9 They avoid the problem of the high-property-
value/low-family-income district by maintaining that every district
except the wealthiest in a state is disadvantaged by traditional financ-
ing systems.30 If educational resources were unlimited this contention
might be valid. But in a world of scarce resources, it must be rejected:
Dollars spent on the non-poor simply cannot be spent on the poor.
Moreover, the failure to distinguish between poor and non-poor
children ignores the impact of private education. In the extreme,
non-poor families can remove their children from the public schools,
purchasing an entire education from private sources. But perhaps
more importantly, non-poor families can supplement the public edu-
cation their children receive. Although it may be difficult to define
28. Robinson noted that the location of commercial and industrial property may
have a significant impact upon educational expenditures. Noting a trend of commercial
migration to the suburbs, the court stated:
Wealthy suburbs are able to attract industry from central cities by preferential
tax rates. The erosion of the central city tax base makes it more difficult for these
cities to raise revenues for school and municipal purposes .... .hhough the
statewide average of equalized valuations per pupil rose from $30,112 in 1960 to$41,026 in 1971, some central cities suffered a decline in valuations per pupil in
absolute or relative terms, or both.
118 N.J. Super. 223, 243-44, 287 A.2d 187, 198 (1972). Cf. Sweetwater County Planning
Comm. for the Organization of School Dist. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971), juris.
relinquished, 493 P.2d 1050 (,Vyo. 1972).
29. See p. 1306, n.15.
30. PRIVATE NVEALTit 154. But cf. Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, where plaintiffs represented
children residing in "relatively" poor districts. The district court indicated that this
definition may -lack legal significance: "Whether 'relative' poverty includes every district
poorer than that one district richest in assessed valuation per pupil need not now be
determined, nor would this appear to have great practical significance in the application
of the general principle." 334 F. Supp. at 872, n.2.
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precisely, there is a point beyond which inputs are not essential to
minimal education, yet are still important to child development. A
policy that directs funds toward districts with non-poor populations
merely makes the purchaser of these important inputs a public agent
rather than a private one. In effect, the policy subsidizes purchases
that would othenvise be made through private transactions. Again,
in a world of scarce public resources, the consequence of such unnec-
essary subsidization is a lessening of the effect education can have on
the children of the poor.
B. Premise Two: District Wealth is Related to Educational
Expenditure Levels
Although some commentators have minimized the significance of
Premises One and Three, all of them agree on the necessity of proving
a relationship between district wealth and educational expenditures
in a challenge to the traditional structure of school finance. a" Premise
Two is the core of the factual argument, as it establishes that variations
in educational expenditures are caused by over-reliance on local prop-
erty taxes.
There are a number of methods for proving this relationship.33
Regrettably, the decisions thus far have accepted the most superficial
analysis and thus have provided little guidance for further study. From
a procedural standpoint, this may be understandable: Serrano, Van
Dusartz, and Hollins were argued on motions testing the sufficiency
31. While the line distinguishing essential and nonessential inputs Is difficult to
draw, it is one that voters, legislators, and courts are frequently obliged to make. In
Serrano, the state urged the court to adopt the reasoning of Briggs v. Kerrigan, which
held that a policy of providing federally subsidized lunches only at schools with kitchen
facilities does not violate the equal protection clause. (Briggs v. Kerrigan, 307 1. Supp. 295(D. Mass. 1969), aff'd 431 F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1970).) Although the California Supreme Court
disposed of defendant's analogy on the grounds that the random availability of kitchens
was unlike the patterned system of discrimination fostered by California's financing scheme,
it added: "Furthermore, the nature of the right involved in the two cases is very different.
The instant action concerns the right to an education, which we have determined to
be fundamental. . . . Availability of an inexpensive school lunch can hardly be considered
of such constitutional significance." 5 Cal. 3d at 599, 487 P.2d at 1251, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
611, n.13 (1971).
However, other programs may not be as easily classified "essential" or "non.essentlal."
See, eg., Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 319 F. Supp. 271 (E.D.N.Y. 1970),
aff'd, 449 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 916 (1972) (New York state
textbook program).
32. See, e.g., Model Complaint in Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Equal Edu.
cational Opportunity of the United States Senate, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 16D.2 at
8281 [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
33. Coons, Clune and Sugarman use a variety of techniques (e.g., bar graphs and
rank order correlations) to establish Premise Two. PRIvATE NVEALTu 62-96, 127-48, All
references in the text to district wealth and educational expenditures are made on a
per pupil basis.
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of the complaints. Thus, the relationship between district wealth and
expenditures-alleged in each complaint-could have been accepted
as proven. But the necessity for proof at eventual trial remains and
thus the casual attitude taken by these courts may prove fatal.
There was, in fact, evidence before the Serrano court that the
correlation between district wealth and expenditures in California's
1076 school districts was +.791. 34 Yet the court ignored this relatively
significant statistic in its opinion. Rather it took judicial notice of
the truism that local revenue is determined by tax base and rate,35
and concluded that "wide differentials remain in the revenue available
to individual districts and, consequently, in the level of educational
expenditures."3 However, the court made no showing of any causal
connection between district wealth and expenditures. Instead, it relied
on a comparison of three districts-Baldwin Park, Pasadena, and Bev-
erly Hills: Noting that annual per pupil expenditures for the three
in 1968-1969 were $577, $840 and $1,231, respectively, the court
assumed that the source of these disparities was the 1 to 4 to 12
variation in district wealth.37 Such analysis is deficient in two respects.
First, the comparison says nothing about the relationship between
district wealth and expenditures in the 1073 other districts. Second,
such analysis ignores the other major variable determining expenditure
levels, the willingness of residents to tax themselves.
1. The Assumption of a Continuum of Predictable Behavior
Serrano's reliance on tax base, to the exclusion of all other factors,
seems to be founded on a belief that poor districts, regardless of their
tax sacrifice, are unable to produce expenditure levels equal to those
of wealthy districts.38 Again, the court relied on a comparison of the
state's wealthiest and poorest districts.30 But proof that an extremely
poor district cannot raise as much revenue as an extremely wealthy
34. Brief for Stephen Sugarman, The Urban Coalition, The National Committee for
the Support of the Public Schools and John Coons as Anicus Curiae at 20, Serrano v.
Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). For the significance of
this statistic see n.112 infra.
35. 5 Cal. 3d at 592, 487 P.2d at 1246, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 606 (1971).
36. 5 Cal. 3d at 594, 487 P.2d at 1247, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 607 (1971) (emphasis addcd).
37. 5 Cal. 3d at 594, 487 P.2d at 1248, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 608 (1971).
38. 5 Cal. 3d at 598, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610 (1971). The inability of
low-wealth districts to raise revenues equivalent to the amounts collected in rich dis-
tricts was the reason used by the court to refute the defense that the financing s)stern
represents a compelling state interest. The court argued that the goal of local control
is illusory in a district incapable of raising funds necessary to support a high qualit)
educational program. 5 Cal. 3d at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620 (1971).
39. 5 Cal. 3d at 600, 487 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612, n.15 (1971).
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one does not refute the significance of tax rates for the vast number




Per Pupil Rate Per Pupil
District A $150,000 2% $3,000
District B 75,000 3% 2,250
District C 60,000 2% 1,200
District D 50,000 3% 1,500
District E 10,000 6% 600
A comparison of Districts A and E supports the Serrano line of rea-
soning: the poorest district would be required to tax at a wholly
confiscatory rate (30%) in order to approach the amounts expended
by the wealthiest district. But such analysis fails to disclose that as
among Districts B, C, and D, it is tax rate, not tax base, that largely
determines the amount available for education. 40
In Rodriguez, the district court also ignored significant statistical
relationships, limiting its discussion to a similar "richest-to-poorest"
comparison.41 As Rodriguez, unlike Serrano, was a hearing on the
merits, its cursory treatment of Premise Two clearly suggests that
school finance plaintiffs may satisfy their burden of proof by the most
simplistic comparisons between the wealthiest and poorest districts in
a state. But Robinson, also a hearing on the merits, 42 exemplifies a
more extensive approach. The court constructed an appendix of data
40. In actuality, this was apparently not the case in California. Amicus briefs Indi.
cated that there was a negative correlation of - .562 between district wealth and edu.
cational tax rates for all districts in 1968-69. (Brief for Stephen Sugarman, The Urbatn
Coalition, The National Committee for the Support of the Public Schools and John
Coons as Amici Curiae at 20, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 601 (1971). When combined with the strong positive correlation between wealth
and expenditures, this statistic further indicates that poor districts, despite high tax
rates, must spend less on education. But the condemning force of such analysis Is lost
when the same conclusion is based on a simplistic comparison of the extremes within
a state.
41. In convincing tabular and graphic form, the plaintiffs demonstrated a close
relationship between district wealth and educational expenditures for the entire range
of a 110 district survey. (Berke Affidavit at 6-7, 13.) However, in its opinion, the court
limited its examination to the state's ten wealthiest and four poorest districts, and the
wealthiest in San Antonio with that city's poorest. (337 F. Supp. at 282.) Again, this is
not to suggest that the court's analysis was factually invalid; only that its tests are so
vague as to ignore more subtle influences which may lead to undesired policy results.
42. 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972). Technically, the case was argued on
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. However, to insure a complete record for
review and to permit opportunity for disputing factual assertions, the court conducted
a trial on the merits.
1312
Vol. 81: 1303, 1972
A Statistical Analysis of School Finance Decisions
from government documents for selected districts in each New Jersey
county, information it utilized in a full discussion of educational fi-
nance. Although the Robinson court arrived at essentially the same
conclusions as those in Serrano and Rodriguez, 3 the decision dem-
onstrates that meaningful analysis of Premise Two is possible with
a minimum of statistical research.- 4
2. The Failure to Consider Other Factors
The failure to fully examine the relationship between district
wealth and expenditures may be due in part to the past assumption
of such a relationship by analysts of educational finance. 45 Neverthe-
less, the causal connection between the two factors is neither absolute
nor automatic. In addition to the total property value of a district,
educational expenditures may be influenced by at least four other
factors:
Mix of Property. Residential taxpayers in a commerce-laden district
have a clear incentive to increase tax rates:40 Such taxpayers will pay
but a fraction of total taxes, and as beneficiaries of municipal services,
will receive far more than they contribute. With this incentive, they
may muster sufficient community support to outmaneuver or outvote
commercial property owners.
Taxpayer Perspectives. The composition of the taxpaying public
may affect the level of educational expenditures. A district containing
a large proportion of families with school-age children can be expected
to support a higher tax rate than one composed of taxpayers who do
not need the public schools. Similarly, the existence of a high propor-
tion of taxpayers whose religious or social views require that their
children attend parochial or private schools should have a depressant
43. 118 N.J. Super. at 237-38, 287 A.2d at 194 (1972). A graph demonstrating this
conclusion was also developed by the court. Id. at 239, 287 A.2d at 195.
44. Coons, Clune and Sugarman comment that: "The analysis of complex state sys-
tems in terms of wealth discrimination can be made convincing without esoteric eco-
nomics or statistics." PRIVATE WEALTH 148. They maintain that Premise Two can be
documented by examining public records on (I) assessed valuation, (2) tax rates, and
(3) pupil populations for the districts in a state. Brief of John Coons, William Clune
and Stephen Sugarman as Amici Curiae (brief re jurisdictional statement of appellants) at
13, Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
45. See, e.g., J. GUriRIpE, G. KLEINDORFER, H. LEVIN, & R. STOUT, ScIooLs AND INEQLAUTy
111-12 (1971); H. JAMES, J. THOMAS & H. DYc:K. WEAL'T ExVF.%DITRES AND DEcISIo.N-
MAKING FOR EDUCATION 99-100 (1963); A. WISE, Ricit ScitooLs, Poop SctooLs: Ti E ProM-
ISE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNrry 121, 127-28 (1969).
46. H. JAMES, J. THO mms & H. DycK, WEALTH Ex.PENDITURE AND DEcIssoN-MAKNc FOR
EDUCATION 72-73 (1963). Cf. Banfield & Wilson, Voting Behavior on Municipal Public
Expenditures: A Study in Rationality and Self-Interest, in TE PcnLic Eco.NoMY or
URBAN COmmuNITiEs U. Margolis ed. 1965).
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effect on tax rates. Other factors such as individual income, prior
education, or unemployment also may influence educational tax rate.4t
The Institutional Framework. The nature of the local decision-
making process may affect the level of educational expenditures. A
board of education that submits its budget to a separate political in-
stitution (e.g., a city council) may produce a different level of ex.
penditures than one similarly situated which must appeal directly to
the public. Tax rate limitations in state law may decree a ceiling on
rate decisions. 48 Conversely, prior expenditure levels tend to set a
floor below which a budget will not fall.49 Finally, many significant
fiscal decisions are negotiable: A strong teachers' union may have an
inflationary effect; a strong taxpayers' group, a depressant one.
Non-educational needs. Although the courts seem prepared to dis-
tinguish education from other public services," the taxpayer may not
do so: He is likely to be more concerned with his total tax burden than
with the specific rate for education. Thus, schools must compete with
other public services for a finite tax dollar. Obviously, their bargain.
ing position is weakest where demand for non-educational services
is greatest.
Such demand, usually termed "municipal overburden," is concen-
trated in urban school districts, where non-educational needs are typi-
cally greatest.5 ' Such districts may be above the state average for
47. See, e.g., Davis, Quality and Inequality: Some Economic Issucs Related to the
Choice of Educational Policy, in TnE QUALITY OF INEQUALITY: URBAN AND SUIJURIAN
'UBLIC ScnooLs 91-95 (C. Daly ed. 1968); H. JAMES, J. THOMAS & 1. DWca, 'Euath
EXPENDITURE AND DECISION-IfAKING FOR EDurvrION 73-98 (1963).
48. Statutory tax rate limitations arc not always inflexible. In California, a majority
of the district's voters may approve a "tax override" (Cal. Educ. Code § 20803.20801
(West. 1969)); in fact most districts do vote to surpass the statutory ceiling. Serrano v.
'riest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 592, 487 P.2d 1241, 1246, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 606 (1971). In contrast,
Florida's tax rate ceilings arc far more difficult to waive. A "millage rollback statnte"
(F.S.A. § 236.251) provides that overtaxing more than ten mills will forfeit particl.
pation in the state's minimum foundation program. A challenge to tie constitution-
ality of the Florida statute, on the ground that it discriminates against districts with
low property values, lingered in the federal courts and was eventually withdrawn by
its plaintiffs. Hargrave v. McKinney, 413 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1969), on remand sub
nora. Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970), vacated sub noin. Askew V.
Hargrave, 101 U.S. 476 (1971). But the Florida legislature has repealed the statute,
effective July 1, 1974, possibly in part as a result of the suit. FLORIDA LAWS 1970, cit,
70-94, 39.
49. Literature on the budgetary phenomenon of "incrementalism" is surveyed in 1.
SIIARILNSKY, SPENDING IN TInE AMERICAN STATES 13-17 (1968).
50. See 5 Cal. 3d at 614, 487 P.2d at 1262-63, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 622.23. See also Van
Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Stipp. at 875, n.8; PRIVATE WEALIit 414-19. But el, Hawkins
v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), af'd on rehearing en bane (1972) (racial
discrimination in the provision of street paving, lighting, water mains, fire hydrants,
and sanitary sewers by a municipality is prohibited by the equal protection clause).
51. For all but one of the thirty-seven largest standard metropolitan statistical areas
in the United States in 1967, per capita non-educational expenditures were greater lit
the central city than in the outlying suburbs. 2 Advisory Commission on Intergovcern.
mental Relations, FISCAL BALANCE IN ThE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM: ALTROI'OLITAN
FISCAL DIsPARITIEs 105 (1967).
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district wealth as a result of their high concentrations of commercial
and industrial property.52 But they may be forced to spend less on
education than "poorer" suburbs with lesser "overburden." A policy
that equalizes merely on the basis of district wealth would igilore this
expenditure pattern and transfer resources from the urban to resi-
dential district.53
C. Premise Three: Educational Expenditures Are Related to the
Quality of Education
Unless Serrano and its progeny are to be interpreted merely as
taxpayer suits, 54 a third link, relating expenditure levels to the quality
of education, is essential. Premise Three thus defines the injustice of
traditional school finance as a denial of equal educational opportunity,
not a mere difference in local tax burdens.
The relationship between expenditures and educational quality, al-
though assumed by many,55 is nevertheless the subject of considerable
controversy. Opponents of Serrano can cite the conclusion of the
Coleman Report 6 that academic performance is primarily determined
by factors other than educational expenditures. While this finding
52. See, e.g., Dimond, Serrano: A Victory of Sorts for Ethics, Not Necessarily for
Education, 2 YALE REv. LAw & Soc. Acriox 133, 139 (1972).
53. Of the school finance cases, only Robinson has explicitly recognized the factor of
municipal overburden, 118 N.J. Super. at 273, 287 A.2d at 213 (1972).
54. The taxpayer's argument is that it is unfair to require residents of poor districts
to bear a higher tax burden than residents of wealthy districts in purchasing equal
educations. Three of the school finance decisions have recognized this taxpa)cr complaint.
In Serrano, the court said merely that the parent-taxpayers had a valid cause of action.
5 Cal. 3d at 618, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
Hollins, on the other hand, focused on taxpayer inequities, arguing-
Arizona's school financing system imposes grossly disparate tax burdens on taxpa)crs
in the different school districts. Taxpayers in a school district poor in taxable wealth
are forced to make a substantially greater tax effort to provide substantially less
monies for the operation and maintenance of their schools in comparison withT what
is required of taxpayers in a district rich in taxable wealth.
No. C-253652 (Super. Ct. Ariz., Jan. 13, 1972) at 5.6 (slip).
Robinson adopted a middle position. The court construed the Education Clause of
the New Jersey Constitution (Art. VIII, § 4, j 1) to establish education as a statewide,
rather than local, purpose. Relying in part upon a second constitutional provision and
in part upon history, the court found uniforn tax rates are mandated. 118 N.J. Super.
at 276-80, 287 A.2d at 215-16. The court thus imposed taxpayer equity as a standard to
measure the equalized nature of a financing scheme.
The primary problem with the taxpayer argument (some pay more and yet receive
inferior service) is that it does not rely upon the unique position of education. The
same argument can be made with regard to any public service financed by property
taxes. Such a view would invite the judiciary to obliterate every aspect of local fiscal
control. Premise Three avoids this difficulty by relating differential expenditures to
the quality of only one governmental function, education.
55. See, e.g., the statement made by Senator Walter F. Mondale: "I don't know how
it can be said that somehow, unlike most other things, money has no relationship to
[educational] output." Hearings 6752.
56. JA Fs S. CoLE.iAN, et al., EQUALrr OF EDUCATIO.,AL Oi'roayuxrrv 312 (1966).
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has spurred extensive criticism and a number of counter-studies, 1 it
is unlikely that educators will arrive at a clear verdict on the cost-
quality issue before the Supreme Court must deal with Premise Three
in Rodriguez. Nor will that Court be greatly aided by discussion of
the question in the decisions to date-opinions which have largely
ignored or assumed away the problems inherent in the cost-quality
debate.
1. Premise Three in the School Equalization Decisions
Serrano (and its progeny) recognizes the necessity for proof at trial of
the alleged relationship between expenditures and educational qual-
ityr s But the cases cited by Serrano in support of this proposition
indicate that the burden of proof may be satisfied by use of what is
in effect an irrebuttable presumption," or a mere showing that in-
creased expenditures produce increased educational inputs of all kinds
(without relating those inputs to the quality of education).00 Among
57. For a brief summary of the more significant criticism see J. GUnIIEa, G. KLEIN.
DORFER, H. LEVIN, & R. STOUT, SCtlOOLS AND INEQUALITY 60-72 (1971); C. SILIBEiMAN,
CRIsIs IN THmE CLASSROOm 72-73 (1970); Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clatse in Public
Education, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1355, 1381-82 (1971). See generally ON EnUALIrY OF EDU.
CATIONAL OPrORTUNITY (F. Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972).
58. 5 Cal. 3d at 599, 487 P.2d at 1253, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 611, n.14 (1971).
59. Serrano "comes close to saying," according to Coons, Clune and Sugarman, that
the court should assume a positive correlation in the absence of proof to the contlary.
Coons, Clune & Sugarman, A First Appraisal of Serrano, 2 YALE REv. LAW & Soc. AwION
111, 114 (1972). The Model Complaint, drafted in part by Professor Coons, adopts a
similarly casual view towards Premise Three. The document measures injury lit terms
of variations in spending, rather than the quality of education,
Two of the cases relied on by the Serrano court suggest that plaintiffs can satisfy
their burden at trial by use of such an irrebuttable presumption. it Mclnuis v.
Shapiro, the court declared: "Presumably, students receiving a 1000 education are better
educated than [sic] those acquiring a S600 schooling." 293 F. Supp. 327, 331. Tihe Serrano
court endorsed this contention. 5 Cal. 3d at 601, 487 P.2d at 1253, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613,
n.16 (1971). Dicta in Hargrave v. Kirk suggests that the court considered proof of tile
relationship between expenditures and educational quality, but the authorities cited
are merely statements of expenditure differentials. Tle district court said that:
Turning now to the defenses asserted, it may be that in the abstract "tile difference
in dollars available does not necessarily produce a difference in the quality of
education." But this abstract statement must give way to proof to the contrary in
this case.
313 F. Supp. 944, 947 (M.D. Fla. 1970), vacated on other grounds sub nuim. Askew v.
Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971). The proof subsequently discussed by the court consisted
of the facts that the challenged statute would cause a substantial dollar reduction it
one county and that exorbitant expenditure differentials existed between counties.
60. In Hobson v. Hansen, Judge Wright, sitting as a district judge, limited his
investigation of intra-district racial discrimination to the "objectively measurable as.
pees" of public education. 269 F. Supp. 401, 496 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub notah, Sutuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Judge Wright's concern for "input" variables
such as per pupil expenditures, faculty salaries and physical facilities leaves unanswered
the question of whether such factors actually affect student performance. The reference
in Serrano to Hobson thus implies a requirement for some proof of a relationship
between inputs and student performance. 5 Cal. 3d at 601, 487 P.2d at 1253, 96 Cal.
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the equalization decisions, only Robinson has required a demonstra-
tion of a correlation between expenditures and measures of both input
and output.61 While conceding that such correlations must be less than
absolute, 62 the Robinson court cited data establishing that expendi-
tures were related to factors such as faculty effectiveness (as measured
by pupil-teacher ratios and advanced degrees) and physical facilities, 0 3
and relied on expert testimony to refute the conclusions of the Cole-
man Report.64
2. Premise Three and Justiciability
The requirement of proving a relationship between expenditures
and the quality of educational output would seem to be an essential
element of the equal protection theory applied in these cases. Serrano
focuses on output-the role of public education in training and pre-
paring a child to compete in society-in declaring education to be a
"fundamental interest."' 6 5 If the evil to be remedied is variance in
Rptr. 613, n.16 (1971). Rodriguez and Vran Dusartz assumed the relationship between
expenditures and educational quality without requiring proof. 337 F. Supp. 280, 284
(W.D. Tex. 1971), Prob. juris. noted, 92 S. CL 2413 (1972); 334 F. Supp. 870, 873-74 (D.
Minn. 1971).
61. 118 N.J. Super. at 246-57, 287 A.2d at 199-205 (1972). The court declared that the
relationship was proven on the basis of probabilities and expert opinion. Id. at 248,
287 A.2d at 200. However, examination of the record indicates that the court need not
have relied on probabilities. Plaintiffs produced an abundance of expert opinion affirm-
ing the cost-quality relationship. The state, in turn, offered no witnesses to contradict
this testimony. The two state witnesses that did testify limited their comments to an
objective discussion of state funding programs and, on cross-examination, admitted the
existence of a cost-quality relationship. Record at 3.117, 590.62. Id. 118 N.J. Super. at 237, 287 A.2d at 194 (1972). The trial court explained that
the level of educational expenditures will be affected by the following non-quality
factors: (1) proportion of high schools to elementary schools, the former normally pro.
ducing higher costs; (2) cost of living; (3) transportation costs; (4) fixed costs and capital
expenditures; and (5) economies of scale.
63. Id. at 249, 287 A.2d at 200-01 (1972).
64. One witness estimated a correlation of +.4 between per pupil expenditures and
student performance. Testimony of Harry S. Dyer. Record at 4.129. While this statistical
showing is less than overwhelming, the court regarded it as significant enough to men-
tion, albeit with qualifications. 118 N.J. Super. at 253, 287 A.2d at 202 (1972). Professor
Dyer also suggested that educators can be "relatively certain" that substantial disparities
in expenditure levels will enable students in wealthy districts to outperform those in
poorer districts. Record at 4.135. He submitted tables which indicated a direct rela-
tionship in New Jersey between per pupil expenditures and college matriculation, verbal
Scholastic Aptitude Test scores, and math SAT scores, and an inverse relationship
between expenditures and truancy rates (Plaintiff's Exhibit). Another expert. Professor
Henry Levin, related per pupil expenditures to both input and output measures of edu-
catiohal quality. He placed particular emphasis on the relationship between dollars
spent and the quality of faculty and administrative personnel. Record at 1.18-1.20. The
court also received affidavits documenting the inadequacy of education in particular
cities with relatively low per pupil expenditures. See affidavit of Aaron Schulman,
Manpower Planner for Jersey City; Affidavit of Daniel Kelly, Jr., Director of the De-
partment of Administration and Finance, Plainfield, New Jersey; Affidavit of Charles
Relley, Secretary and Business Administrator, Paterson Board of Education.
65. 5 Cal. 3d at 606-10, 487 P.2d at 1257-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 617-19 (1971). Cf.
PRivArE WEALTH 2-11, 415-16.
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educational opportunity, it is the quality of output, not the amount
of expenditures, which is critical.66
Insistence on output equality, however, would very likely lead the
courts into a non-justiciable morass. 7 Experts will continue to disagree
on the relationship between expenditures and student performance.0 1
Achievement tests, the most widely accepted proof of such performance,
will continue to pose interpretive problems. 9 And most importantly,
a focus on output would require the courts to distinguish the varying
needs of individual students; the summary rejection of such a task
by the Supreme Court in Mclnnis v. Ogilvie70 suggests that the courts
are unlikely to decree a standard of equal output.
Insistence on input equality, by contrast, raises no such problems.
Courts have already had considerable experience with many input
standards.7 1 Moreover, per pupil expenditures can be used as a short-
hand for all purchasable inputs.72 Indeed, one of the equalization
decisions, Van Dusartz, holds that a showing of expenditure equality
66. See, e.g., C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLaSSROOMi 69 (1970). Coleman has argued
that equality of educational opportunity should be measured by results of the schooling
process. Coleman, The Concept of Equality of Educational Opportunity, 38 1lAgt,. Et ,.
REV. 7 (1968). Even critics of the Coleman Report praise the document for its emphasis
on educational output, suggesting that the Report has led educators away fron their
concentration on input analysis. Mosteller & Moynihan, A Palhbreaklng teport in
ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 28 (Mosteller F. D. Moynihan eds. 1972), r/.
The Poor, the Schools, and Equal Protection, 38 HARV. Evuc. Ritv. 635, 651 (1968).
67. See Comment, The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education, Municipal Services,
and Wealth, 7 HARV. CIv. RInTs-Civ. Lw. L. REV. 103, 175-76 (1972).
68. Robinson may thus be a rather unusual case. Given the controversy aroused by
the cost-quality issue, it is rather surprising that the defense did not present a single
expert to refute Premise Three.
69. Cf. Ratner, Inter-Neighborhood Denials of Equal Protection in the Prov'ision of
Municipal Services, 4 HARV. Civ. RicniTs-Civ. Lw. L. REV. 1, 6 (1968).
70. 394 U.S. 322 (1969), aff'g sub nor., Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Stpp. 327. The
court affirmed per curiam without the benefit of oral argument or briefs on the netits,
See also Burruss v. Wilkerson, 397 U.S. 44 (1970), aff'g 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969).
The California Supreme Court distinguished these two earlier cases by contrasting the
"nebulous concept" of student needs with the "familiar standard" of wealth dliscrimlia.
tion. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 617, 487 P.2d 1241, 1264-65, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,
624-25 (1971).
71. During the period between Plessy v. Ferguson (163 U.S. 537 (1897)) and Brown
v. Board of Education (347 U.S. 483 (1954)), the courts identified at least sixty Inputs
relevant to the question of whether the separate schools were in fact cqual. See Larson,
The New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wisc. L. REV. 470, 482-83. See also Keyes V.
School Dist. Number One, 313 F. Supp. 61, enforced, 313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo, 1970),
rev'd in part, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971).
72. A number of courts have included in their desegregation decrees an order that
per pupil expenditures be substantially equalized among all schools in the district.
United States v. Jefferson County, 372 F.2d 836, 900 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub norm.
Caddo Parish School Bd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Lee v. Macon County
Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 489 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd sub norn. Wallace v. United States,
389 U.S. 215 (1967); United States v. Plaquemines l'arish School Bd,, 291 F. Stipp, 811,
849 (E.D. La.), aff'd as modified, 415 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969): Kelly v. Althetner, 378
F.2d 483, 499 (8th Cir. 1967). Prior to 1954, courts frequently relied on expeodlture
comparisons to determine whether separate schools were equal. See H. AsuNioutr, Tie
NEGROES AND THE SCHOOLS 109-10 (1954).
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is sufficient.7 3 Nevertheless, the courts should be prepared to consider
the varying costs of educational inputs among districtsT4 to insure
that expenditures bear some meaningful practical relation to the qual-
ity of education provided.ro
D. The Legal Argument: The Demonstrated Chain Between
Individual Wealth and Educational Opportunity Is
Constitutionally Impermissible
Taken together, Premises One, Two, and Three link the quality
of education in a district to the individual wealth of its residents.
Two lines of cases are used to support the conclusion that such systems
73. Van Dusartz states:
Plainly put, the rule is that the level of spending for a child's education may not
be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole.
334 F. Supp. at 872 (1971).
74. If plaintiffs choose to rely on per pupil expenditure lariations to satisfy the
input standard, courts should at least recognize the defense that the existing differentials
relate to uneven cost patterns. In Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 8.1.1 (D.D.C. 1971).
the district court faced a comparison between black and white schools in Washington.
D.C. Defendants argued that the disparity related to economies of scale attained within
the older, black schools. The court's procedural treatment of this issue can serse as
an example for future judicial analysis of Premise Three. Judge Wright sieted the
disparity as prima facie evidence of racial discrimination, thus transferring the burden
of proof to the defendant. The economies of scale argument, while credible, was found
insufficient to explain the entire S100 difference. Since the defendant had not suc-
ceeded in disproving the prima facie case, the cost analysis was unsuccessful as a defease.
Id. at 850, 853. This approach would mean that plaintiffs in school finance cases can
meet their initial burden by proving only Premises One and Two. If, however, defendants
established that expenditure disparities were caused wholly by salid cost reasons, the
Premise Three burden would return to plaintiffs. Cf. Fessler & Harr, Beyond the Wrong
Side of the Tracks: Municipal Services in the Interstices of Procedure, 6 HAtv. CtV.
RIGHTs-Civ. LIm. L. REV. 441, 450 (1970).
75. While judicial concern may be limited to insuring a relatively equal input stand-
ard, legislatures and administrators are not so confined. The) may, as a matter of policy,
compensate students with special needs. In reopening Hobson, Judge Wright emphasized
this possibility:
while setting a minimum standard, the Court did not wish to preclude the school
administration from focusing, if it saw fit, on equality of output, in tents of
giving each student an equal educational opportunity to attain his own unique
potential, rather than an equality of inputs.
327 F. Supp. 844, 856-57, n.22 (D.D.C. 1971).
Although the legal status of such compensatory programs has not yet been fully
resolved, there are indications that such affirmative action would not run afoul of
equal protection theory. Several courts have upheld "benign" quotas that explicitly
benefit black school-children. (See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 I-n'.
L. REv. 1065, 1108, n.190 (1969).
And while legislation discriminating against blacks must bear strict scrutiny (Mc-
Laughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). remedial
statutes have been examined by the more permissive rational means standard. Tometz
v. Board of Educ., 39 Ill. 2d 593, 600, 237 N.E.2d 498, 502 (1968); School Comm. of
Boston v. Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 698-700, 227 N.E.2d 729, 733-3- (1967), appeal
dismissed, 389 U.S. 572 (1968). Cf. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARS.
L. R.V. 1065, 1106-11 (1969); Comment, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary
Zoning after Valtierra and Dandridge, 81 YAtx L.J. 61, 76-80 (1971). If wealtli is also a
"suspect classification," consistent treatment suggests that a "discrimination" in favor
of the poor, where need is sufficiently documented, would be constitutionally permissible.
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are invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.71 The first, dealing
with voting and criminal procedural rights, establishes wealth as a
suspect classification. 7 The second proclaims the significance of edu-
cation. 8 Both, however, are open to challenge: Recent opinions in
Dandridge v. Williams70 and James v. Valtierras0 suggest that the
Supreme Court may be reexamining its approach to wealth discrimi-
nations. And despite considerable dicta on the importance of cdu-
cation, the Supreme Court has never explicitly declared it to be a
"fundamental interest."8'
But reversal by the Supreme Court with regard to the legal argu-
ment should not preclude reform in educational finance. State courts
would remain free to follow Robinson and apply equal protection
guarantees in most state constitutions.82 Moreover, regardless of the
76. After Serrano, the only case concluding to the contrary was Spano v. Board of
Educ. of Lakeland Cent. School Dist. #1, 68 Misc. 2d 804, 328 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct.
1972). In upholding the constitutionality of New York's financing system, the court
considered itself bound by the Supreme Court's disposition in Mclis v. Ogilvie, 394
U.S. 322 (1969), afrg sub norn. Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968) and
Burruss v. Wilkerson, 397 U.S. 44 (1970), aJf'g, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969). See u.70.
77. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (invalidating state filing fee re-
quirements for primary elections); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (requiring
free transcripts in non-felony cases); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969)(invalidating filing charge prior to invocation of appellate review); Gardner v. California,
393 U.S. 367 (1969) (providing free transcripts of habeas corpus hearings); Swenson v.
Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967) (requiring counsel on criminal appeal after trial attorney
withdraws); Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (requirinF transcripts of
habeas corpus hearing); Eskridge v. Washington, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (invalidating pro-
cedure granting free transcripts for appeal only if trial justice determines that justice
will be promoted).
78. Prior to Serrano, no decision had held education to be a "fundamental" interest.
Dicta on the significance of education, however, is abundant. See, e.g., Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 US. 483, 493 (1954); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603(1967); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247 (1968); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 633 (1969); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 229 (1971) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
79. 397 U.S. 61 (1971) (welfare system allowing smaller families greater per child
payments than those received by larger families, held permissible under the Equal
Protection Clause).
80. 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (requirement that voters approve low-income housing prior
to construction, permissible under the Equal Protection Clause).
81. Most of the cases cited in Serrano (5 Cal. 3d 584, 606-08, 487 P.2d 1241, 1256-59,
96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 615-19 (1971)) to demonstrate the significance of education hIvolve
racial discrimination, a classification that invokes strict scrutiny regardless of the interest
involved. It is important to note in this regard that, unlike the United States Supreme
Court, the California Supreme Court had already invalidated de facto segreation In
public education and, therefore, had already held that district lines were irrelevant
where racial discrimination was involved. Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59
Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1963); San Francisco Unified School Dist,
v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 479 P.2d 669, 92 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1971). Whether courts
without such precedent will be as willing to obliterate district boundaries when the
discrimination is based only on wealth is open to considerable speculation. Conversely,
it is conceivable that the equalization cases could be used against de facto segregation:
A court that obliterates district lines to prevent wealth discrimination may find It dif-
ficult to deny similar relief when the classification is based on an even more invidious
factor, race.
82. Robinson relied primarily upon the New Jersey Constitution, which provides:
"The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and ef.
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Court's decision the future of state school finance will be determined
largely by state legislatures8 3 If Serrano and its progeny are reversed,
the legislatures remain free to equalize local educational burdens
through state aid. If the decisions are upheld, the highly unspecific
rulings will be remanded to them for implementati6n. In the re-
mainder of this Note, the possible implications of such restructuring
will be analyzed.
II. An Empirical Analysis of Educational Finance in Connecticut
A. Educational Finance in Connecticut Today
Connecticut state educational aid-which now contributes about
33% of the cost of current education-has little equalizing impact.
Some 75% of total non-capital state aid is in the form of a flat $210
per pupil grant,84 which obviously has no ameliorative effect on the
disparities in local educational burdens. A second 10% comes through
special education grants for both exceptional and handicapped stu-
dents.85 Since such children are likely to be distributed randomly
ficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in te State
between the ages of five and eighteen years." N.J. CoNsr. art. kIII, § 4, I 1. Most
state constitutions have similar clauses. See A. WIsE, Rici! ScHooLs, Poop Sc1ooLs: TIu
PRoMIsE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 97-98. But ef. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584.
595-96, 487 P-2d 1241, 1248-49, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 608.09 (1971) (constitutional requirement
of a system of common schools held not to mandate equal expenditures, but only to insure
uniformity in broad curriculum matters).
Moreover, state courts are free to interpret state equal protection clauses more strin-
gently than the federal provision. See, e.g., Booker v. Board of Educ. of Plainfield, 45 N.J.
161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965).
83. School finance courts both before and after Serrano have recognized the central
role of the legislature. Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1965). alJ'd sub
nom. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572.
574 (W.D. Va.), aff'd, 397 U.S. 44 (1970); Van Dtusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 877
(D. Minn. 1971); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. 280,
286 (W.D. Tex. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 92 S. Ct. 2413 (1972); Robinson v. Cahill, 118
N.J. Super. 223, 280-81, 287 A.2d 187, 217 (1971). Cf. Sweetwater County Planning Comm.
for the Organization of School Dist. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971), junis. relin-
quished, 493 P.2d 1050 (1972).
Following Serrano, a number of plans were proposed in the California legislature to
reform school finance. One, Senate Bill 90, which came close to passage, attempted to
meet the requirements of the decision by increasing the state's foundation program by
approximately fifteen per cent, increasing allowances for special educational needs, and
imposing tax limits (largely equal to the prior year's rate) on high-tax districts. The bill
passed the assembly but was defeated in the senate amid charges that it was "starkly
regressive" and would actually disadvantage the cities. See San Francisco Chronicle,
Aug. 3, 1972, at 22; id., Aug. 4, 1972, at 1.
84. Act of July 1, 1971, Special Act 1, § 13 (1971). Connecticut Public Acts 2333.
All percentages computed from CONNECTICUT STATE DEPART.MENT OF EDUvCTION., STATE
GRANT PAY.MENTS MADE FOR PUBLIC AND No.%PuBLic SCHOOL PRocrAMIS AND AcrirmEs
DURING 1970-71 8-8A (1971). [Hereinafter cited as STATE GRANT P.A.Y mENTs 1970-71.]
85. See CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 10-76a-g (Supp. 1969).
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throughout the state, the grants should not be expected to have any
equalizing effect.
There are also a number of categorical grants designed to reim-
burse towns for special burdens or endeavors in which the state has an
interest: School libraries,86 occupational 1 and agricultural training,88
transportation of students, 9 driver and adult education,?0 school con.
struction,91 and the presence of state humane institutions. -2 Most of
these categorical programs, however, incorporate a matching concept,
and many smaller towns lack the resources to participate fully in such
cost-sharing projects. Such towns are also often unable to hire skilled
consultants with the expertise necessary to compete for limited state
fundsY3 Indeed, in both state and federal categorical grants,91 it ap-
pears that grantsmanship and the capacity to meet matching require-
ments, more than real need, determine the amount given to each town.
One grant program-Special Aid for Disadvantaged Children-allo-
cates funds according to local wealth (the number of families with
incomes of less than $4000 or with children receiving benefits under
the Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children).9 5 However,
as this program accounts for only 6% of total state aid, it obviously
has little overall impact.
A recent study by the National Education Finance Project ranked
Connecticut fiftieth in terms of the equalizing impact of state aid. 0
Our own study found that there was absolutely no correlation be-
tween either individual or district wealth and total current state
86. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 10-267 (Supp. 1969).
87. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 10-95, 97 (Supp. 1969); Act of July 15, 1971, P.A. No.
841, Connecticut Public Acts 1559 (1971).
88. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 10-65 (Supp. 1969).
89. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 10-266j (Supp. 1969); CONN. GEN. SrAT. REV. §§ 10.273a.
277 (Supp. 1969).
90. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 10-24a and § 10-71 (Supp. 1969).
91. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 10-286 (Supp. 1969).
92. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 10-266 (1958).
93. See, e.g., S. WEISS, ExIsTiNG DISPARITIES IN PUBLIC SCIOOL FINANCE AND PROIPOSALS
FOR REFORM-RESEARCH REPORT TO THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON 68 (1970).
94. Connecticut towns apparently play the grantsmanship game for federal aid. In
1970 they received over nineteen million dollars in federal educational assistance, CON-
NECTICUT EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, LOCAL EDUCATIONAL FINANCE 1969-70, 13 (1971). Of
this, approximately nine million came from Title I of the 1965 Elementary and Sec.
ondary Education Act, designed to aid disadvantaged children, Id. The remainder came
from a multitude of smaller grant-in-aid programs. That such programs, estimated by
one source to number 232 (WEIsS, supra note 93, at 63) place a premium on grantsmanl.
ship is suggested by the fact that New Haven received almost twscc the federal assistance
given to similarly situated Bridgeport. CONNECTICUT EDUCATION ASSoCIATiON, LOCAL EUt.
CATIONAL FINANCE 1969-70, 8 (1971).
95. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 10-266a-266k (Supp. 1969).
96. Johns & Salmon, The Financial Equalization of Public School Support Programs in
the United States for the School Year, 1968.69, 4 NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL FINANCE PROJwr
137 (1971).
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grants.97 Thus, Connecticut is perhaps the archetype of a pre-Serrano
system of educational finance and should illustrate the premises noted
above concerning non-equalized fiscal systems.
B. The Sample
The following analysis is based on the 130 largest towns in Con-
necticut (including 95% of the population and 96% of total property
values) as they existed in 1970.98 These towns constitute both the
general municipal and school taxing districts, with no overlapping
jurisdictions such as counties to obscure local fiscal decisions.90
C. Definitions
In order to avoid the ambiguities which plague the school fin,-Mce
decisions, this Note will define at the outset the terms used in its
analysis.
1. Individual Wealth
There are at least three fundamentally different ways to express
the individual wealth of the residents of a given town: Median family
income, mean family income, and the percentage of families below the
"poverty level." Although the three are obviously related, they may
produce different results when correlated with district wealth or edu-
cational expenditures.
Median family income is the income of the family at mid-point'of
all those in a town.100 As it represents the income of the "middle"
family, it is not influenced by the typical distribution of wealth where
97. The linear correlation coefficient between total property v.alue/pupil and total
state grants for current education was .045; similarly the correlation between median
family income and state grants was -. 006. For an explanation of these statistics see
n.112 infra.
98. The primary reason for omitting the thirty-seven smallest towns and using 1970
as the base year was to allow the use of individual income and other socioeconomic
data available only from the United States Census. Two other medium.sized towns
were also omitted from the sample as both are atypically "non-local" school systems.
The tax base in Groton is largely tax-exempt federal property (a submarine installation),
and the town therefore receives an abnormally high amount of federal "impacted" aid.
Similarly, Mansfield's grand list is abnormally low due to a tremendous percentage of
state property (the University of Connecticut), and it also receives substantial indirect
educational aid in the form of a university supported school system.
99. Connecticut is thus unusually well-suited for such a study. Both taxing and
spending decisions are clear to observer and taxpayer alike and there are no incentives
for "creative accounting" either to overinclude items in the education budget to garner
more state funds or to underinclude them to placate "school district" taxpayers.
100. See U.S. BURtEAU OF THE Ca.sus, C.Nsus OF POi, ULkrO: 1970, GENERAL SOCIAL
AND EcoNo.,C CHAnAcramsIcs, Final Report PC(l)-CB, CoNxrcncur App. 26 (1972).
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a few have a large share of total income while many have a small
one. Median family income thus provides a measure of how fiscal
decisions affect the "typical" family.
Mean family income is the average obtained by dividing total family
income by the number of families in the given group.1" 1 It may
therefore be somewhat misleading since it can represent an "average"
between one very rich family and ten poor ones. But mean family
income does have the advantage of indicating the amount of total
individual wealth in a given group. This factor is therefore particularly
useful in analyzing the impact of fiscal alternatives on a group as
a whole.
Finally, insofar as the school finance decisions are dependent on,
or at least concerned with, the "poor," a third expression of individual
wealth-the percentage of families with incomes of less than some pre-
detefmined' 0 2 "poverty level"-becomes critically important. This is
particularly true when significant "pockets of poverty" exist within tax-
ing units which nevertheless have relatively high median or mean in-
comes because they include many middle- and upper-income families.103
2. District Wealth
The Serrano court defined district wealth as assessed valuation per
child.10 4 Although the concept of taxable wealth per pupil is basically
sound, recent policy debate over the decisions suggests that a number
of different definitions of "district wealth" are possible. Some have
argued that it ii the impact of property taxes on the home-owner
or renter that should be of greatest concern; 105 others have suggested
101. Id. at App. 26.
102. The index used by the Bureau of the Census provides a range of poverty Income
cutoffs, adjusted by such factors as family size, sex of family head, number of children
under 18 years old, and farm and nonfarm residence-124 thresholds against which the
total family income of each family in the sample is tested. At the core of this definition
is a nutritionally adequate food plan ("economy" plan) designed by the Department ot
Agriculture for "emergency or temporary use when funds are low." Id. at App. 29 30.
103. For example, while Hartford and New Haven had poverty indices approximately
250% of the state average, their median and mean incomes were only about 25% below
the state norm.
104. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 592, 487 P.2d 1241, 1246, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 606 (1971).
105. General discontent with residential property taxes was elevated to presidential
proportions in 1972. See President Richard Nixon, The State of the Union Address,
Jan. 20, 1972, 8 NVKLY. CoNMP. PRES. Doc. 66, 71 (1972). The President directed the U.S,
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations to study school property taxes,
with special attention to an Administration proposal to replace residential, but appar-
ently not commercial, school property taxes with a federal value.added tax. Presldent
Richard Nixon, Letter to Robert Merriam, Chairman, Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations, Jan. 20, 1972, 8 NVKLY. Co-MP. PRES. Doc. 92-93 (1972). However,
the Administration quickly added that the value-added tax, which was to be made less
regressive by family rebates, was "by no means a final decision .... " See N.Y. Times,
Feb. 2, 1972, at 35, col. 1. The President himself promised that the Administration would
not "replace one regressive tax [the residential property tax] with another regressive
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that it is the uneven impact on commerce and industry-and the con-
sequential "lumping" of business properties-that is of primary in-
terest.10  This Note will measure "district wealth" in terms of both
categories: Included is a calculation of the values of "residential prop-
erty," which made up slightly over 55% of the total state grand list,OT
and "business property," which made up slightly over 15% 1
Furthermore, a more refined definition of district wealth should
account for the increasing non-educational burdens borne by the
larger cities. There is, of course, no precise method for measuring this
overburden: To do so would first require an impossible judgment as
to which services a municipality should provide. Nevertheless, it is a
simple fact of municipal finance in Connecticut that the percentage
of total property tax revenue committed to non-educational and capital
expenditures ranged from 8.5% in one small town to 81.3% in one
large city-with the other 167 towns in a complete distribution in
between.10 9 These differing non-educational expenditure levels there-
fore were accepted as a fiscal given, and a second set of "revised" dis-
trict wealth indices was generated to reflect the differences in district
"ability-to-pay" due to non-educational expenses.








The Serrano court based its analysis on "per pupil expenditures."1 0
Apparently the court did not feel it was necessary to define this term
tax." President Richard Nixon, News Conference of February 10, 1972, 8 WNELY. Co.%st.
PEs. Doc. 413, 417 (1972).
In April, the President again stressed the residential thrust of his proposals, noting
that an increase in the number of school bohd rejections indicated the "increasingl,
intolerable burden against which millions of homeowners have begun to rebel ....
President Richard Nixon, Remarks to the National Catholic Education Association Con-
vention, April 6, 1972, 8 WKLY. COM1I'. I'mS. Doc. 727-28 (1972).
106. See MINN. STAT. ANx. §§ 473F.01-473F.13 (Supp. 1972). The Minnesota plan is
an attempt to distribute commercial growth throughout a region by pooling all future
development for tax purposes. But by restricting its scope to "conmmercial-industrial
property," the plan does little to end enclaves of low or high residential property taxes.
107. The grand list is the total dollar value of all assessed property.
108. Computed by the authors from Tables in STATE OF CoxNECrjcT, IFORz NTIO'
RELATIVE TO TilE ASSESSMENT AND COLLECTION OF TAxES, 1970 (1971) 82.-85.
109. Statistics from computer analysis on file with the YALE LAW JOL'1NAL.
110. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 594, 487 P.2d 1241, 1248, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 608 (1971).
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more precisely. Yet it may represent a number of different formula-
tions depending on whether it includes state and federal aid or only
local educational expenditures, and whether it encompasses capital ex-
penditures or is limited to current costs. Here, educational expenditures
will be defined as the amount of local revenue-and local revenue alone
-spent for the current education of each child. This definition thus
excludes both state and federal aid and the retirement of capital bonds
(which may be bunched at any one point in time).
4. Independent Variables
A more complete analysis of Premises One and Two requires that
independent factors be held constant. AlthoUgh it is obviously im-
possible to account for every possible variable, this Note selected
three for further analysis: The median educational attainment of
those over 25, the percentage of all children in public schools, and the
percentage of professional and technical workers in the population. 11'
It can be hypothesized that educational expenditures will vary directly
with all three: That is, that the taxpayers will be more willing to tax
for education: a) The more educated they themselves are, b) The more
they use public rather than private or parochial schools, and c) The
more education has had an impact on their own careers. Through
partial correlations these factors will be held constant to determine
whether the relationships in Premises One and Two are significant
in and of themselves or are merely secondary ones hiding deeper causal
connections.
D. The Surface Validity of Premises One and Two
1. Premise One: The Relationship of Individual Wealth to
District Wealth
The linear correlations 12 between the three measures of individual
wealth and the six of district wealth were as follows:
111. For the definitions and methodology underlying these statistics see U.S. BURVAU
OF THE CENSUS, op. cit., supra note 100, at App. 8-10, App. 18-25. Median educational
attainment was given in the census text; the percentage of children in the public schools
for towns with over 10,000 was computed using public school enrollments from CoN-
NECTICUT EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, LOCAL EDUCATIONAL FINANCE 1969-1970, at 8.13 (1971) and
total school enrollments from the census data, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, op. cit., Supra
note 100, at 215-22, 354-59; the professional percentage was computed utilizing census
data. Id. at 236-42, 366-71, 401-08.
112. The linear correlation coefficient for a set of observations of two variables, X
and Y, indicates the degree to which the observations coincide with an imaginary line
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TABLE I
Median Mean % in
Wealth Wealth Poterly
Grand List/pupil 0.449 0.558 -0.144
Residential Value/pupil 0.659 0.760 - 0.314
Business Value/pupil -0.140 -0.074 0.330
Revised Grand List/pupil 0.553 0.660 -0.261
Revised Residential- Value/pupil 0.718 0.815 -0.377
Revised Business Value/pupil -0.090 -0.030 0.218
This matrix supports the following findings:
1. Although both median and mean family income correlate fairly
highly with total grand list/pupil, the correlation between poverty
families and this expression of district wealth is not significant. Thus,
the popular belief that the "poor" live in "poor" districts is clearly
mistaken.
(L) drawn so as to minimize the sum of the distances (d) betwen the predicted line and




Perfect correlation-that is a pattern where every observation is on the imaginary line
-is indicated by a coefficient of either +1.000 or -1.000, depending on whether the
slope of the imaginary line is up or down, whether the two factors vary directly (as
X increases, Y increases) or inversely (as X increases, Y decreases). A coefficient of 0.000
indicates a complete lack of any correlation, or random behavior. Thus, the greater the
coefficient, whether in the positive or negative direction, the closer the actual observations
conform to a straight line, and hence the more they exhibit a linear relationship.
It should be noted that all of our correlations are linear-that is, the) measure only
the degree to which the observed behavior coincides with a straight line. Though we
did establish-by means of a distribution plot-that our key variables produced fairly
normal distributions (bell-shaped curves), and thus that there was no compelling reason
to look further for non-linear (for example, exponential or logarithnic) behavior, a
more complete statistical proof might wish to consider the possibility of non.linear
correlation.
The point to be emphasized is that such a correlation coefficient-as well as the partial
correlation and linear regression coefficients described below-are based on every ob-
servation (every town), not merely the two or three points at the extremes of the con-
tinuum. The coefficient thus offers a better chance of understanding the entire set of
school districts than does a "biggest-to-smallest" comparison which may well ignore
important behavior in the far greater number of towns between the two extremes.
1327
The Yale Law Journal
2. When only residential value/pupil is considered, however, there
is a very significant relationship between district wealth and all three
measures of individual wealth.
3. In addition, there is a significant positive correlation between
family poverty and business wealth. Thus, the "poor" tend to live in
districts which are actually "wealthier" in terms of commercial and
industrial property.
4. Revision to account for overburden tends to make more striking
the relationships between all indices of individual wealth and total
and residential value. However, it makes the relationships between
all three and business wealth less significant. This should not be sur-
prising in view of the relatively high concentrations of business wealth
in major cities where overburden is greatest.
Thus, it may be concluded that Premise One is valid if we confine
our examination to total district or residential wealth and to median
or mean income. It is clearly incorrect, however, to contend that the
"poor" live in "poor" districts: The relationship between poverty
families and total district wealth is unclear; and in terms of business
wealth, the findings show that the "poor" actually live in the "wealth-
ier" districts.
2. Premise Two: The Relationship of District Wealth
to Expenditures







Revised Grand List/pupil 0.779
Revised Residential Value/pupil 0.760
Revised Business Value/pupil 0.365
These correlations support the following findings:
1. All measures of district wealth correlate quite highly with ex-
penditures/pupil.
2. Moreover, the degree of correlation is equally significant wheth-
er the measure of district wealth is total assessment or residential value.
But the degree of correlation between business wealth and expendi-
tures is considerably less.
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3. The impact of municipal overburden on the district wealth-
expenditure relationship is pronounced. In every instance the degree
of correlation is greater when overburden is considered. This finding
suggests that overburden-as well as district wealth-is a significant
factor in expenditure decisions. However, while noting that municipal
overburden is important, it still may be concluded that Premise Two
is generally valid.
3. The Direct Proof of a Relationship Between Individual
Wealth and Expenditures
To the extent that both Premises One and Two are valid, it should
follow that there is also a direct relationship between individual wealth
and expenditure levels. But as noted above, despite the strong rela-
tionships between median or mean family income and district wealth,
the relationship between the percentage of poverty families and prop-
erty values is far from clear. Not surprisingly, then, while the correla-
tions between both median and mean family income and expenditures/
pupil are quite significant, .638 and .719, respectively, the relationship
between poverty families and expenditures is inconclusive, -. 178.
While it may be valid to say that expenditures/pupil are related
to some measure of individual wealth, it is not correct-at least in
Connecticut-to assume that there is an inverse relationship between
poverty and such expenditures. Thus, the major factual assumption
of Serrano-that the educational financing system discriminates against
the "poor"-is simply false in Connecticut.
4. The Direct Proof of an Inverse Relationship Between Tax
Effort and Expenditures
Although it was not necessary to its decision, the Serrano court
suggested that the true injustice of the California system was demon-
strated by the fact that extremely poor districts not only had to tax
more to spend the same as rich districts but also had to tax more to
spend less.113 While there may be a few districts in Connecticut in
such a position, we found that as an overall correlation, the relation-
ship between tax effort-as measured in mill rate equalized for both
varying assessment ratios and inflation-and expenditures was not
significant, -. 107. But it should be remembered that this "icing on
the cake" is not essential. All that a plaintiff need prove in Premise
113. 5 Cal. 3d 587, 599-600, 487 P.2d 1241, 1241-42, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 611-12 (1971).
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Two is that there is a relationship between district wealth and ex-
penditures-and this generally is true in Connecticut.
E. The Effect of Independent Variables on Premises
One and Two
It has already been suggested that the relationships between indi-
vidual wealth and district wealth and between district wealth and
expenditures may be a product of many variables. Unfortunately,
some of the most interesting factors are beyond the scope of statistical
analysis, as they are impossible to quantify. This Note has not, for
example, considered the impact of local political cleavages, strong
teachers' or taxpayers' associations, or attitudinal differences among
parents, although all may have some part in fiscal decisions. The analy-
sis here will content itself with three variables which one reasonably
might suspect would influence local educational decisions: Profes-
sionalism, educational levels, and "public schoolness."
1. Premise One and Independent Variables
The partial correlations" 4 between the measures of individual and
district wealth, with each of the three independent variables held


































Med.Inc. Mean Inc. % Pov.
.4592 .5968 -. 1437
.5545 .6601 -12613
.5534 .6606 -. 2620
.553 .660 -.261
Residential ValuelPupil Revised Residential ValuelPupil
.5799 .7099 -.1921 .6262 .7598 -.2417
.6581 .7590 -. 3129 .7346 .8270 .13836
.6590 .7596 -. 3141 .7179 .8154 -. 3774
.659 .760 -. 314 .718 .815 -.377
Business Value/Pupil Revised Business ValuelPupil
-.0890 -.0138 .3100 -.0577 -.0110 .2051
-.2001 -. 1098 .3823 -. 1365 -.0570 .2508
-.1392 -.0733 .3294 -.0891 -.0293 .2171
-.140 -.074 .330 -.090 -.030 218
114. The primary purpose of the partial correlation coefficient is to express the
degree of correlation between two variables, I and J, while removing the Influence of
a third variable, K. For example, in calculating a high degree of correlation between
I (people with red hair) and J (educational attainment), a study might wish to factor
out the impact of K (intelligence) to determine whether it was the relationship between
red-hairness and attainment or between intelligence and attainment that wag really
at work. We would do this by essentially subtracting the correlation coefficients be-
tween I and K and between J and K from the calculated I, J correlation by removing
the degree of correlation between red-haired people and intelligence and between in-
1330
Vol. 81: 1303, 1972
A Statistical Analysis of School Finance Decisions
In each case the individual wealth-district wealth matrix supports
the following findings:
1. Holding educational level constant reduces the relationship be-
tween individual wealth and district wealth. This is not particularly
surprising as exclusionary zoning is likely to result in educational as
well as economic segregation.
2. Professionalism and "public schoolness" appear to have no sig-
nificant impact on the relationship between individual and district
wealth.
3. So far as these three independent variables are concerned, it
may be concluded that the relationship between individual and dis-
trict wealth is a strong one.
2. Premise Two and Independent Variables
The partial correlations of district wealth and educational expendi-































telligence and educational attainment from the red-haired to attainment relationship.
By comparing the partial correlation coefficient with the unfactored coefficient, it
is possible to assess the degree to which the independent variable influenced the rela-
tionship between the first two. A substantial decrease (in magnitude, not in sign) from
the unfactored to partial correlation suggests that the first relationship (as between
red-haired people and educational attainment) was a spurious one masking a more
significant relationship (as between intelligence and attainment). Conversely, a minimal
decrease suggests that the original relationship is valid independcntly of the third
variable. Finally, a substantial increase in magnitude suggests that the original rela.
tionship is even stronger when other factors are held constant.
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These matrices support the following findings:
1. Professionalism and "public schoolness" have very little effect
on the relationship between district wealth and expenditure levels.
2. But educational level tends to be significant in two ways: Hold-
ing education constant, the relationship between total and residential
value and expenditures tends to decrease; but the relationship between
business wealth and expenditures tends to increase. This phenomenon
may be explained by the fact that educational level-as it follows
individual income-tends to be greatest in areas zoned for residential
as opposed to commercial use.
3. In all cases, the district wealth-expenditure relationships tend
to survive the factoring of these three variables and thus appear to be
independently strong correlations.
3. Premise Two and Individual Wealth
The most obvious omission from the above analysis is the impact
of individual wealth on the perceived relationship between district
wealth and expenditures. As already noted, there does appear to be
a fairly strong relationship between individual wealth and expendi-
tures. If the perceived relationship between district wealth and ex-
penditures is a spurious one-that is, if the "poor" spend less regardless
of the operation of the property tax system-then the focus of the
school finance decisions is misplaced. The interdependent impact of
individual and district wealth on educational expenditures must there-
fore be examined.
The partial correlations between district wealth and expenditures,
holding individual wealth constant, are as shown in Table V on
following page.
These matrices support the following findings:
1. Holding constant individual wealth-in terms of median or
mean family income-does have a significant impact on the perceived
relationship between district wealth and expenditures. Factoring out
the effect of individual wealth lessens the relationship between total
district wealth and expenditures by approximately 25 per cent. The
same factoring decreases the relationship between residential wealth
and expenditures by 50 to 60 per cent. Holding individual wealth
constant, however, increases the relationship between business wealth
and expenditures by 40 to 50 per cent. These findings again support
the conclusion that the individually wealthy live in "rich" districts
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only in overall or residential terms: It is the individually poor who
live with business wealth.
2. But while individual "wealth" may have some effect on the
district wealth-expenditure relationship, individual "poverty" has little
impact. Once again, it is clear that "individual wealth" as used in the
school finance decisions cannot refer to the poorest in our society.
Yet, before one concludes that Premise Two is statistically invalid,
he must also consider the effect on the individual wealth-expenditure











Mfed. Inc. Mean Inc. 0%, in Pay.
.5132 .5714 -. 1142
.3702 .4590 .0343
.7183 .7772 -. 3053
.3977 .4347 .0419
.2045 .2623 .1809
.7237 .7840 -. 2834
.638 .719 -. 178
The Yale Law Journal
These matrices support the view that just as individual wealth ap-
pears to be a significant component of the district wealth-expenditure
relationship, so district wealth may influence the correlation between
individual wealth and expenditures. Again the interdependence of
the two types of wealth is clearest when residential or overall wealth
is analyzed. And again, the strong relationship between the "poor"
and business wealth is demonstrated.
Perhaps most importantly, it should be noted that when the most
common definitions of individual wealth (median income) and dis-
trict wealth (total grand list) are analyzed, their interdependence is
almost equal:
1. Correlation Between Total Grand List and Expenditures:
Uncontrolled .624
Controlling- for Median Income .491
2. Correlation Between Median Income and Expenditures:
Uncontrolled .638
Controlling for Total Grand List .513
Thus, in the absence of specific findings on the effect of other
variables, individual and district wealth appear to combine to produce
differences in educational expenditures. While the precise nature of
this relationship is open to further examination, these findings show
that the simple assertion that the poor live in poor districts and
therefore spend less on their children's education is not only ambigu-
ous but also simply incorrect.
III. The Impact of Permissible Fiscal Alternatives
The above analysis suggests that the validity of key assumptions in
the school finance decisions depends on the definitions used. It should
not be surprising, then, that the impact of different systems of school
finance also varies with both the scheme employed and the particular
group under consideration.
In the analysis that follows, fifteen fiscal alternatives will be exam-
ined to assess the progressivity or regressivity of each as measured
against individual income. Progressivity is, of course, only one element
in the selection of a fiscal system: One could just as well assess a
system's predictability, administrative cost, morality, or commercial
impact. But Serrano and its progeny are essentially concerned with
the problem of providing education in a society with vast disparities
in individual wealth. It therefore makes sense to focus on the way in
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which these fiscal alternatives solve that problem by shifting resources
from the rich to the poor.115
A. The Alternatives
Five taxes and three expenditure patterns were chosen to represent
the broad range of alternatives a legislature faced with a Serrano
decree could enact.11, In each case the taxation scheme was designed
to raise $800 million;" 7 in each, the expenditure pattern was designed
to distribute the same amount. The tax contribution of each district
was then subtracted from its expenditure grant to determine its net
gain or loss (per pupil) under each alternative.
1. The Five Taxes
The most obvious form of taxation which would pass muster under
Serrano is a state-wide property tax of a uniform rate levied on all
115. Students of the school equalization decisions may raise two objections to the
discussion that follows. The first is that we arc confusing the concepts of district and
individual wealth by comparing the net gains or losses for a district as a whole with
the individual income of those who live there. The objection will correctly note that
not all of the taxes proposed here will be paid by individuals who live in the district:
Some will come from businesses which, in turn will pass the burden along to their
stockholders, employees, or consumers. This criticism fails to recognize that while the
residents of a given town may not "pay" the hypothetical tax, it is, in a very, real sense,
their money. Were it not for a system of centralized financing established to conform
to Serrano, the residents would have those funds in their local treasury to spend on
public goods and services. Thus, a city's contribution to a state.wide scheme does come
from its residents, as they have that much less to spend in the combined public.private
market. It is therefore proper to compare the net outcome of a fiscal system to an
entire district with the individual wealth of those who live there.
Second, it may be objected that this analysis has failed to allow for a system wherein
each district is free to select a tax rate and a corresponding expenditure level decreed
by the state-so-called power equalization. (For the genesis of the power-equalizing
alternative see PrvrATE WEALTH 20042.) The Note has indeed chosen to ignore the
power-equalizing model. First, to the extent that its proponents consider only the
expenditure side of financing, they have trivialized the problem. It is quite easy to
decree that all towns will be allowed to spend the same amount for each per cent of
taxation; it is more difficult to recognize that in any such equalization there will be
both "winners" and "losers," and that who wins and loses may depend equally on the
system of taxation that is employed.
Moreover, it is impossible to predict, in any statistical way, the net effect of power
equalizing. Again, it is trivial to note that a rich town will either have to drop its
expenditure level by $400 or raise its tax rate by 20 mills. It is far more difficult to
determine which alternative-or which one of an almost unlimited number of rcsponses
in between-the political process of the town will produce. Finally, as follows from the
above, a focus on power equalizing misses the fundamental point that the centralization
of school financing could utilize taxes other than those on property.
116. Each of the schemes to be discussed meets the Serrano mandate that educational
expenditures per child be independent of either individual or district wealth. See 5
Cal. 3d 584, 589, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 604 (1971).
117. The $800 million level was chosen as it is an approximation of the total level
of state and local educational spending in Connecticut today. See CowiEricuT PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE COUNCIL, LOCAL PUBLIC SCHOOL EXPENSES AND STATE AID IN CONNECTICtr
2 (January, 1972) for the trend suggesting the $800 million level for 1972-1973 year.
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property following the equalization of assessments. In order to simulate
such a tax, a mill rate of 39.7 was applied to each town's grand list
(revised for varying assessment ratios and inflation).
To deal with suggestions that the costs of education be placed on
various components of the grand list, both residential and business
property taxes were simulated by applying mill rates of 66.2 and
338.1 to the residential and commercial values respectively. While
such high mill rates are quite unlikely, they were used in order to
demonstrate the effect of choosing such a tax as one component of
an overall fiscal system.
Since it is also very possible that the states will choose to reduce
or eliminate the role of property taxes in educational finance, the
analysis simulated the other two most common forms of state taxation
-sales and personal income taxes. In simulating a broad based sales
tax-one which would exempt food and shelter as necessities-its bur-
den was assumed to be proportional to family income. This simulated
tax was therefore set to exact the same percentage of income-7.55
per cent-from each family. However, it should be remembered that
the consequences will be different if the sales or value-added tax
employed is either more regressive or progressive as a result of its
particular exemption scheme.118
Similarly, the experience of the states demonstrates that a wide
range of personal income taxes is possible, with differences in exemp-
tions, deductions, exclusions, and rate structures. 119 In order to be
familiar to the greatest number, this analysis employed the structure
of the federal income tax and applied a flat "piggyback" percentage
of 41 per cent to the 1970 average federal tax burdens for each income
category.
2. The Three Expenditure Patterns
The most obvious, and also most simplistic, expenditure pattern is
the basic per pupil alternative, wherein each district receives the same
amount of aid per student.
A second option gaining in popularity among commentators is one
which recognizes the varying educational burdens caused by unequal
socioeconomic conditions-the commonly termed compensatory model.
Many different formulas could be applied to take account of additional
educational needs resulting from illiteracy, health problems, psycho-
118. See PRENTICE HALL STATE AND LOCAL TAXES j 92,952-92,965 (1972).
119. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF TIIE STATES 1972-1973 224 (1972).
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logical needs, or simple underexposure to mental stimulation. This
Note has chosen the index of family poverty to represent the need for
such compensation. But it would be unrealistic to believe that a leg-
islature would ever distribute all funds solely on the basis of need.
The "compensatory" scheme was therefore set to allot 75 per cent of
total funds in the form of "foundation" grants on a per pupil basis
and to distribute only 25 per cent according to the number of poverty
families.
A third option was designed to account for the unequal distribution
of non-educational municipal needs-the overburden alternative. The
simulation was constructed to distribute 75 per cent of the grants on
a per pupil basis and 25 per cent according to the district's total ex-
penditures committed to non-educational needs.
B. The Redistributive Impact of the Alternatives
The regression coefficients of the fifteen alternatives when com-
pared to individual wealth were as follows:
TABLE VII
Med. Inc. Mean Ic. % in Pot,.
Property Tax and Per Pupil Expenditures -. 0983 -. 0835 5083
Property Tax and Compensatory Model -. 1233 -. 0982 10826
Property Tax and Overburden Model -. 1001 -. 0849 5639
Residential Tax and Per Pupil Expenditures -. 1463 -. 1163 9980
Residential Tax and Compensatory Model -. 1713 -. 1315 15724
Residential Tax and Overburden Model -. 1484 -. 1182 10536
Business Tax and Per Pupil Expenditures .0408 .0113
Business Tax and Compensatory Model .0158 .0034 -9310
Business Tax and Overburden Model .0387 .0099
Sales Tax and Per Pupil Expenditures -. 0763 -. 0665 2704
Sales Tax and Compensatory Model -. 1013 -. 0813 8447
Sales Tax and Overburden Model -. 0784 -. 0690 3260
Income Tax and Per Pupil Expenditures -. 1517 -. 1257 6640
Income Tax and Compensatory Model -. 1767 -. 1404 12384
Income Tax and Overburden Model -. 1537 -. 1271 7196
These coefficients'"- indicate that the income tax alternative is the
most progressive, followed by residential property, total property, and
sales taxes. The tax on business property-though a centralized one
120. The linear regression coefficient represents the slope of the imaginary line that
best fits the observed data in the linear correlation described above. See n.l12 supra.
A positive coefficient indicates a line that slopes up from left to right; a negative co-
efficient indicates one which slopes down from left to right. The greater the coefficient,
regardless of sign, the greater the slope.
Thus a positive coefficient and slope comparing gains front a fiscal alternative to
family income indicates a regressive scheme as the wealthy receive more; a negative
coefficient and slope would indicate a progressive scheme as the wealthy receive less.
But when family poverty is used to measure family wealth, just the opposite is true.
Since the slope of the line and hence the numerical value of the coefficient is
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which would satisfy Serrano-not only failed to transfer resources from
the rich to the poor but (like a befuddled Robin Hood) took from
the districts inhabited by the "poor" and gave to those of the indi-
vidually wealthy.
The compensatory model, tied directly to individual wealth, proved
to be the most progressive of the expenditure patterns. But this al-
ternative, allotting 25 per cent of all available funds on the basis of
economic need, still did not fundamentally alter the general progres-
sive-to-regressive pattern decreed by the chosen tax. Such a finding
should signal those involved in the restructuring of educational finance
that choice of tax is perhaps even more important in terms of overall
income redistribution than choice of expenditure pattern.
Second, it is clear that the additional grant for municipal overbur-
den did not greatly change the overall character of the taxing and
spending scheme: A commitment of 25 per cent of all funds produced
differences of only about 5 per cent, as far as progressivity was con-
cerned. Again this suggests that it is the choice of taxing scheme, not
expenditure option, that is of paramount importance.
Even more dramatic than these comparisons between the poor and
the rich are the transfer payments between four archetypal towns.1,
The simulation produced the following matrix of net gains and losses
for these four hypothetical towns (Table VIII, following page).
An examination of these figures suggests that one's preference among
fiscal alternatives very definitely depends on his residence. Big City
(a city with a population of approximately 115,000) is slightly disad-
vantaged under the two most likely forms of equalization-state-wide
obviously dependent on the unit chosen to measure the two variables, comparisons
between regression coefficients with different variables are meaningless. The numerical
value of the coefficient-and hence the slope of the imaginary line-is relevant only In
comparisons based on the same unit measure. It is thus meaningful to compare the
slope of the lines derived from two fiscal alternatives when the same measure of In&U-
vidual wealth is used.
121. Each "hypothetical town" is actually a statistical conglomeration of five real
towns-scattered throughout the state to minimize the impact of regional differences-
with similar socioeconomic and geographic characteristics. The "town" averages were:
Big Mill Golden Small
City Town Ghetto Burg
Population 136,000 52,500 19,400 3,00)
Poverty (%) 9.4 4.2 2.0 4.3
Median Family Income $10,400 $11,600 $19,300 $12,900
Median Educational Attain-
ment (yrs.) 11.1 12.0 13.0 11.2
Foreign Born (%) 12.2 8.4 6.2 3.8
% of Grand List
Business 26.2 16.0 6.8 10.8
Residential 41.0 52.2 7"3.2 5610
1338
Vol. 81: 1303, 1972
A Statistical Analysis of School Finance Decisions
TABLE VIII
(Transfer Payments in S/Pupil)
Big Mill Golden Small
Fiscal Alternative ciLy Town Ghetto Burg
Property Tax & Per Pupil - 45 - 98 - 79 +22-1
Property Tax & Compensatory + 200 -132 - 250 +181
Property Tax & Overburden + 37 - 64 - 13 104
Residential Tax & Per Pupil + 283 - 24 - 476 +215
Residential Tax & Compensatory + 530 - 57 - 47 +171
Residential Tax & Overburden + 367 + 16 - 526 +143
Business Tax & Per Pupil -1295 -463 +1047 +710
Business Tax & Compensatory - 801 -496 + 524 +674
Business Tax & Overburden -12,14 -423 + 996 +639
Sales Tax & Per Pupil - 5 + 55 - 392 +340
Sales Tax & Compensatory + 242 + 23 - 552 +297
Sales Tax & Overburden + 77 + 94 - 442 +263
Income Tax & Per Pupil + 114 +217 - 84t6 +514
Income Tax 8= Compensatory + 359 +185 -1017 +471
Income Tax & Overburden + 196 +257 - 896 +443
property or sales taxes with a simple per pupil distribution. It is enor-
mously penalized by a plan that employs a tax on business property.
Mill Town (an industrial blue collar suburb of about 50,000) is
slightly penalized by both overall and residential property taxes and
is severely disadvantaged by a business property tax. It receives a slight
transfer payment from alternatives based on a sales tax and is treated
even more favorably under the income tax model.
Golden Ghetto (a bedroom suburb of about 20,000) is substantially
taxed under the income, sales and residential property tax models.
It also loses under the overall property tax model, though not enough
to qualify this scheme as truly "progressive." Not surprisingly in view
of its exclusionary zoning, it reaps a substantial windfall from a tax
on business property.
Finally, Small Burg (a rural town with a population of about 3000)
appears to gain under every scheme. This is explained by the fact
that only Small Burg has both low property values and low individual
incomes. But here too there are choices to be made: Small Burg resi-
dents will favor schemes based on income or business property taxes
over other alternatives.
In conclusion, it should be noted that these transfer payments are
quite large: Given the state average per pupil expenditure of approxi-
mately $1000,122 some of them amount to forcing one district to pay
the total educational costs of another district of the same size.
122. See CONNECTICUT PUBLIC EXPENDrrIuRE COUNCIL, LOCAL- Pu13UC SCoHOOL FNrr-'sEs
AND STATE AID IN CONNECTICUT 3 (January, 1972) for historical trend suggesting tile $1000
level for 1972-1973 year.
1339
The Yale Law Journal
Thus, school equalization based on formulas that appear reason.
able can have a truly redistributive effect. But a poorly designed al-
ternative may have no impact at all, or may actually result in sub.
stantial transfer payments from the cities to the suburbs, from the
poor to the rich. Such findings suggest that if the redistributive prom-
ise of the school finance decisions is to be realized, those who are
charged with restructuring educational finance have to evaluate with
care the ultimate effect of all fiscal alternatives. 123
IV. Conclusions
Within the holdings of the school equalization decisions, educational
finance may be restructured in ways which will further disadvantage
the poor. This will be the case as long as the courts merely decree
broad guidelines for educational equality and do not specify the
source of school funds. Ideally, the courts should write their decisions
so as to insure that the primary source of such funds will be a pro-
gressive tax. A truly activist court might hold that true equal protec-
tion will not be possible until basic public services are funded by
progressive taxes. There is, however, little likelihood that the Ameri.
can judiciary will attempt to exercise such decidedly legislative powers.
If they do refuse to do so, they will have three alternatives in future
equalization suits.
First, they can continue to ignore the problems of income redistri-
bution and focus instead on the short-run equalization of local tax
burdens. But this alternative might produce systems which will fur-
ther disadvantage the poor. Moreover, it would force the courts to
acknowledge the irrelevancy of the "poverty" 24 cases and thus deprive
their decisions of any legal foundation.
A second course would be to do nothing-to decline to examine
financing systems on the grounds that such an analysis is hopelessly
non-justiciable. Perhaps the decisions to date, even if reversed by the
Supreme Court, have sensitized the public to present inequities and
reform will occur without further judicial coercion. Perhaps fears of
massive busing or the demolition of exclusionary zoning will provide
additional impetus for partial reform in educational finance. But it
123. In May, the Ford Foundation announced grants totalling over $560,000 to the
Rand Corporation, Brookings Institute, National Academy of Education, and Syracuse
University to study the fiscal and educational implications of the equalization decisions.
Ford Foundation, News Release, May 15, 1972.
124. See notes 22-23 supra.
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seems equally likely that century-old systems of local finance will not
be fundamentally altered without judicial intervention. And it seems
even more likely that reversal by the Supreme Court-even on ground
of non-justiciability-will be taken as an endorsement of the inequita-
ble status quo.
The final approach would be to confront fiscal realities and provide
the legislatures, and the public, with a far more precise definition of
educational equality. The courts must recognize both the complexities
of educational finance and the limitations of judicial intervention;
they must avoid the rather simplistic logic of past opinions and ac-
knowledge the inherent problems of equalization. If they are prepared
to engage in such honest analysis, their work may yet produce the
economic and educational reform the nation clearly needs.
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